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Opportunistic Claiming Behavior in Two-sided Market

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Abstract: Although consumer opportunistic behavior has drawn attention from managers and scholars for a long time, a special context of two-sided market has been ignored. A multi-stage research program, comprising in depth interviews (Study 1) and three experimental studies (Studies 2, 3, 4), explored opportunistic claiming during service guarantee. The main characteristics of two-sided market (consumer, platform and reference group) are considered in this paper. The findings are as follows: 1) consumers with higher level of Machiavellianism are more likely to claim in an opportunistic manner. 2) The reasonable compensation would evoke the desire for cheating behavior for Low Machs, while reduce the probability of opportunistic claiming behavior for High Machs. Both platform attitude and reference group only have significant effects on Low Machs. Specifically, 3) platform with tolerant attitude would face to more opportunistic claims and 4) reference group’s opportunistic manners would misguide others to do so.

Keywords: Opportunistic claiming behavior, Service guarantee, Two-sided market

1. INTRODUCTION

Bi Sheng, chief executive of online shoe company Letao.com, complaint that one million pairs of shoes were sold in 2010, while more than 100,000 consumers return. “People sent these shoes back during 30-day warranty period with the excuses like wearing inappropriate, but these shoes had already worn for a month.” he said. Opportunistic behavior also appears frequently in the largest two-sided platform (www. taobao.com) in China, for examples, freight insurance deception (purchase and return several goods by one-time delivery but using the dividing return process to gain multiple shipping compensation), “ward robes” (e.g., the purchase, use and return of clothing[1]) and cheating on service guarantees[2].

Consumer’s opportunistic behavior brings severe damages especially for the small and medium-sized sellers. Firstly, the higher return rate would lead to the lower search ranking and bad reputation. Secondly, more stock and working capital are required to maintain daily operation [3]. Additionally, the manual process of returning is complicated, so labor costs would increase at the same time [4].

Therefore, there is one often most debated and controversial argument that weather or not to provide service guarantees with less restricted condition. Theoretically, service recovery is an effective way to attract new customers and to retain the goodwill of customers who experience a service failure [5]. But, practically, many enterprises believe non-ethical behavior of consumers will bring financial and managerial dilemma.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

Increasing researches start to focus on the dysfunctional and deviant customer behavior [6] [7], which also can be called jay customer behavior [8]. The cheating returns and complaining [1] [9] involved in this consumer opportunistic claiming are a subset and are related to service guarantee.

However, prior literature largely approached the field in the traditional context such as hotel chain [10], restaurant [11], and department store [12]. Our study extends this line of enquiry by exploring customer’s opportunistic behavior in the context of two-sided market. We consider two-sided market on the perspectives of

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three components: the two-sided users (consumer themselves and sellers) and the platform owner

2.1 opportunistic claiming behavior

Opportunistic is one kind of unethical behavior, which refers to pursuing self-interest with guile or taking advantage of opportunities as they appear. During this process, the opportunists are regardless to principles or consequence, but are keen on what can rather than what should be done in a context. In the service guarantee context, an opportunist has been described as someone who “may not be a chronic gold digger, but rather just someone who recognizes an opportunity to take financial advantage of a company’s service failure and recovery efforts”[13].

The primary cause of opportunistic behavior is information asymmetry which people use to mislead or distort the truth. This phenomenon reflects that selfish and self-central inheres in human nature. But not all the individuals will take this kind of behavior when they handling interpersonal conflicts, it can be controlled or influences by several factors [14]: 1) environment factors including industry background, economic development, law system and culture, and 2) personal characteristics including Machiavellianism in this paper [15], culture of country and organization [16] and moral intensity[17].

2.2 service guarantee

Service guarantee refers to an explicit promise made by the service provider to (a) deliver a certain level of service to satisfy the customer and (b) remunerate the customer if the service is not sufficiently delivered [18]. Service guarantee originally aims to cover the gap of information asymmetry and enhance satisfaction with recovery [19]. Yet, as the information era come, this gap is changed and customers take a relatively passive role especially in the field of compensation sought.

On the perspective of designing, the level of compensation is quite crucial. Previous researches focus more on the pro-purchase behavior. Some of them indicate a positive effect of a greater amount of compensation on the purchase intention, while others hold the point that the overcompensation (i.e., more than 100% of the value of the service) may not [20]. Nevertheless, currently scholars pay more attention to post-purchase behavior whereby consumer knowingly and incorrectly report service failures or make illegitimate complaints [9], showing that greater compensation lead to higher opportunistic rate, because buyers can benefit from such behavior, while overcompensation can avoid the opportunistic claiming via bringing a sense of guilty to some extent [21].

All in all, service recovery policies are open to abuse [22], but the relationship between compensation and opportunistic claiming behavior has not yet formed a unified conclusion especially in the context of two-sided market.

2.3 two-sided market

Two-sided market refers to the kind of market in which one platform enable interactions between end-users, and try to get the two sides “on board” by effectively marketing and management strategies [23]. So the buyers’ opportunistic behavior is not only affected by marketing strategies adopted by sellers but also by the management and service offered by platform makers and the other buyers in the same side.

Although the issue about consumer opportunistic behavior is so important to managers, the service recovery literature is largely silent on this field in the context of two-sided market. The present study beginning to address this gap by exploring the three questions as follows:

- What is the suitable compensation of service recovery to avoid opportunistic claiming behavior;
- What attitude platform should have towards user’s opportunistic claiming behavior;
- How the reference group in the same platform influence other consumer’s opportunistic claiming behavior.

3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES

For the consumer themselves, Machiavellianism is a typical characteristic being used in exploring unethical
behavior. The concept is used to describe a person’s tendency to be emotionally cool and detached, and thus more able to detach from conventional morality and as well to deceive and manipulate others. Rawwas, Vitell and Al-Khatib (1994) empirical researched the consumers in Lebanon and got the conclusion that the higher Machs, the greater likelihood of opportunist behavior was [24], while Erflemeier, Keiller and Thorne Lechair (1999) draw similar conclusion in the study for Japan.

**H1:** Consumer with high-level Machiavellianism is more likely to claim in an opportunistic manner.

There are so many differences between different levels in Machiavellianism [25]. The MACH-IV test we used to measuring a person’s level of Machiavellianism was developed by Christie and Florence L. Geis in the 1960s. People scoring high on the scale (we call High Machs in this paper) may be able to understand and know others better, but they cannot understand emotional clues such as guilt, shame or sympathy [26]. As a result, the ones with lower score (we call Low Machs in this paper) may generate more guilt when facing greater generous guarantee, and see more risks when facing minimal generous guarantee, so reasonable compensation would make them more comfortable to consider about opportunistic claiming behavior. On the opposite, High Machs are not sensitive to risks and guilt, so they will pursue the extra interests through opportunistic claims.

**H2a:** Low Machs are more likely to claim opportunistically when they are offered reasonable compensation.

**H2b:** High Machs are less likely to claim opportunistically when they are offered reasonable compensation.

For reference group, the effects of word-of-mouth (WOM) are documented to be significant on member growth in the Internet context compared with the traditional one, as there are more channels to receive information such as forum, community and review system [27]. Consequently, the interaction between user groups are more frequently and last longer [28]. Moreover, Scholars like Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006) had proved that the negative WOM had more propagation effect on the purchase decision , in other words, consumer would believe negative reviews (include experience of opportunistic behavior) rather than positive ones [29]. Consumer would be less guilty and treat opportunistic behavior more common, if they see other behavior like this.

**H3:** Consumers are more likely to claim opportunistically when they have heard the other consumer doing so.

For platform owners, one of their main obligations is monitoring participants to make sure the order and discipline are established and maintain well [30]. Specifically, monitoring means the management methods market owners take to “police” or “control” platforms to make sure no opportunistic behaviors including “lying, stealing, cheating, and calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate, or otherwise confuse” will happen [31]. Monitoring process likely generates uncomfortable social pressures to comply with social norms [32], while increase the ability of market owner to detect opportunistic behaviors [33].

**H4:** Consumers are more likely to claim opportunistically when platforms show a tolerant attitude.

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**Figure 1. Conceptual Model.**

Solid lines show the hypothesized relationship; intermittent lines show the interaction effect which cannot be proved.

4. **METHOD AND ANALYSIS**

Table 1 provides an overview of the four studies conducted as part of this research program. Study 1 used in-depth customer interviews to explore the most reasonable level of compensation and the main reason for
opportunistic claiming behaviors. Study 2 to 4 followed up with experiments to directly test the hypotheses on the perspective of compensation, platform attitude and reference group’s behavior.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Study 1</th>
<th>Study 2</th>
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<tr>
<td>Data and context</td>
<td>In-depth interview</td>
<td>Questionnaire</td>
<td>Experiment</td>
<td>Experiment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sample size (N)</td>
<td>22 student interviewees</td>
<td>91 student respondents</td>
<td>108 student respondents</td>
<td>72 student respondents and 161 working adult respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesized relationship with opportunistic claiming</td>
<td>Findings</td>
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<tr>
<td>H1: Machiavellianism</td>
<td>√</td>
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<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
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<tr>
<td>H2: Compensation</td>
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<td>√</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>H3: Platform attitude</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>H4: Reference group</td>
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**Study 1- in-depth interviews**

In study 1, we conducted semi-structures in-depth interviews to find the possible reasons for consumer opportunistic claiming behavior and the attitude toward compensation. 22 interviewees were approached including 15 females and 7 males and the age of respondents are ranged from 21 to 58 years. Responders were recruited by their friends to facilitate an open and trusting interview atmosphere.

**Compensation**

Almost all the respondents regarded returning goods without charges of delivery as the most reasonable compensation, but there still are few of them thought it is acceptable even asking the consumer to pay delivery fee. In the term of over compensation, people view the mental compensation (e.g. apologize and follow-up service) and the material compensation (e.g. cash and coupon) as the extra parts besides free shipping. Examples of quotes featuring reasonable compensation are:

"... What we only need is the free shipping for returning. We should not pay for examining the quality of the goods by ourselves..." (Zhen, 26 years, graduate student)

"... I do not care about the fee itself, but I think if the duty is belonging to sellers, it's better for them to pay the bill." (Ding, 28 years, bank worker)

It is noticeable that some of interviewees calculated the cost of artificial handling such as time and energy they spend on returning strategy into the reasonable compensation. So we control and minimize the effects of artificial costs in later examination by using door-to-door service.

**Moral attitude**

The attitude towards opportunistic claiming can be divided into two groups. Someone think this kind of cheating behavior is immoral, so they will never do it at all. The words they used were such as "wrong", "bad manners" and "absolutely not". To the opposite, others argued that the opportunistic behavior is not illegal and can bring benefits actually, so they want to try if possible. The examples are as following:

"It's immoral. It's cheating... Good guys never behave like that...I'll be shamed if my friends do such thing." (Zhang, 58 years, Mechanical professor)

"It's a common phenomenon ... We, consumers, have right to do so if sellers make their promises... Why not? If we can try the goods than decide whether we want pay for them..." (Du, 27 years, graduated student)

After interviews, we do MACH-IV test (20 items with 7-point Likert scale, and Cronbach's Alpha off all the items was above 0.71) to measuring respondents' level of Machiavellianism, and find that the ones with strict attitude towards opportunistic behavior are in lower level (Low Machs), while the ones with tolerant attitude are in higher level (High Machs). In other words, the high level of Machiavellianism will be more likely to claim in an opportunistic manner, supporting hypothesis 1.

**Study 2- experiment on Machiavellianism**
However, the self-claiming method have limited that where are small size of samples (22 interviewees) or respondents cannot explain their behavior clearly, so the decision making process had not been explored yet. To test our conclusions stably and specifically, we designed Study 2.

**Method**

The questionnaire used in Study 2 adopted 5-point Likert scale (ranging from 1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree). To reduce potential social desirability biases, a scenario cum role-playing approach was used providing respondents with a projective task [29]. The roleplaying scenario approach has been used in research on unethical decision making and behavior in the past [8].

The questionnaire was divided into three parts. The first part of the questionnaire is scene instillation. We assume individuals have a special requirement about spiked shoes because they will attend a 100-meter dash and wish to win the competition. But they don’t have a pair of professional running shoes which are useless in other occasion and also costly. Finally they decide to buy the ones in a middle-size online shop offering the unconditional guarantee in platform A. The second part of the questionnaire aims to measure the possibility of opportunistic claiming behavior. In this part, we adopted the Multidimensional Ethics Scale (MES) [34]. To measure intention to take questionable actions (α=.889) and to cognitive the reasoning process using several modes (e.g., justice, α=.911; utilitarianism, α=.665; and deontology, α=.783). The MES was proved to be effective in moral reasoning not only for university students but also for professional life [34]. The third part of the questionnaire is the scale of Mach Scale (IV) Likert-type scale [29]. According the result of pretext, we reduce items from 20 to 7 for higher Cronbach’s Alpha (.76).

**Sample**

The paper questionnaires were sent to 91 undergraduate students, with 100% usable feedbacks. 39% of the respondents are male, and the age range was between 18 and 25 years old.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3. ANOVA analysis between Low Machs and High Machs</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent variables</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilitarianism</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deontology</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Opportunistic claiming</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05  Significance levels are for logistic regression and ANOVA analysis

**Analysis and findings**

We employed the logistic regression to explore the moral reasoning towards opportunistic claiming (see Table 2) and the ANOVA analysis to administer the mechanism why the level of Machiavellianism can significantly affect the probability of opportunistic manner (see Table 3).

Generally speaking, these three moral modes (p<0.01) and the level of Machiavellianism (p<0.01) all have positive effects on opportunistic claiming. Firstly, if individuals believe that the returning behavior is justice both for buyers and sellers and this manner is accepted by the common values, they will more likely to do so. Secondly, the more benefits and fewer risks they receive, the higher possibility of opportunistic claiming happened. People always maximize their own profits, so the higher perceived value will lead to higher return rate. Thirdly, deontology is also considered by consumers. Unwritten contract and unspoken promise restrict consumer behavior, so people will make unethical decision when they think it doesn’t broke social rules.

Finally, the result about Machiavellianism also supports H1 as Study 1. High Machs are more likely to do opportunistic manner than Low Machs. The reasons of this phenomenon are showed in the outcomes of ANOVA analysis (see Table 3). There are significant differences in justice (p<0.001), deontology (p<0.001) and opportunistic claiming (p<0.001) when compared the higher level Machiavellianism to the lower level ones. The
high group thinks the opportunistic claiming is more justice and deontological, because they are not sensitive to 
guilt, shame or sympathy. As a result, High Machs treat the returning behavior as a reasonable one, and will 
adopt frequently. It is also noticeable that the difference in utilitarianism is not significant.

**Study 3- experiment on compensation and platform**

The first experiment was designed to test the effects of compensation offered by sellers (H2) and attitude 
from platform (H3) on opportunistic claiming behavior.

**Method**

A 3 (compensation policy) × 2 (platform attitude) between-subjects factorial design was used. A scenario 
cum role-playing approach was used in the same context of online shopping. But before the respondents get into 
the scenario, there appeared news from authority site to announce the attitude of platform A. The strict one 
described as platform want to take the serve measures to punish cheaters, while the tolerant one just said the 
goal of this platform is protecting the rights of consumers.

On the other hand, compensation policy can be divided into three levels described in the scenario according 
to the result from Study 1. The low level means service compensation without back shipping fee, while the high 
level means the compensation are not only including the price of goods and shipping fee, but also offers a 
coupon for next transaction. For the most reasonable level, the medium one means the compensation included 
original cost and returning shipping fee.

The rest of the questionnaire is consisted with the scales of Machiavellianism and opportunistic claiming 
intention which are same as the one appeared in Study 2.

**Sample**

We used online survey in Study 3, and designed the news part as a popup with a certain period to make 
sure all the respondents read it. 108 useable responses were obtained including well-educated students. 63% of 
the respondents are female, and the age range was between 18 and 25 years old.

**Analysis and findings**

Study 1 and 2 pointed that the reasoning process for Low Machs and High Machs are various, so in this 
part we analysis the two different groups specifically. The individual’s Machiavellianism score above mean 
value we call High Machs, while the ones with the fewer score than the mean value we call Low Machs. Then, 
MANOVA is applied to explore the effects of compensation and platform attitude on the opportunistic claiming 
behavior (see Table 4).

In the perspective of compensation, the results differ between the two groups. For the Low Machs group, 
both compensation (F (2,108) =3.6, p<.05, X̄low=1.9, X̄medium=2.5, X̄high=2.3) and platform attitude had significant 
main effects on opportunistic behavior. But no interaction effect reached significance in the MAVONAn. The 
reasonable compensation can balance the guilt for the extra compensation and the risk for the lack of guarantee, 
so they can easily behave opportunistically. They may feel more comfortable and unrestrained when they meet 
the sellers take medium level of compensation strategy. As to the High Machs group, only compensation 
reached significance (F (2,108) =2.632, p<.10, X̄low=3.2, X̄medium=2.9, X̄high=3.1). However, unlike the situation 
for the Low Machs, the reasonable compensation will bring less opportunistic behavior. The reason is that High 
Machs have less sense of guilt, shame or sympathy and recognize the dark side of the society more clearly, so 
they are not sensitive to the extra gifts or unexpectd risks.

In the perspective of platform, policy or announcement took by platforms to avoid and warn the unethical 
manners are useful only for Low Machs (F (2,108) = 3.9, p<.05, X̄strict = 2.0, X̄tolerate=2.5). The ones with higher
moral standard care more about the social rules, so they will have stronger pressures if they want to returning goods with personal reasons. To the contrast, High Machs focus on building their own wealthy and are regardless of moral condemnation; as a result, they would ignore the attitude of platforms unless there are relative laws.

**Table 4. MANOVA results on opportunistic claiming**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Low level</th>
<th>High level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>df</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machiavellianism</td>
<td>2.727</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compensation</td>
<td>3.600</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platform Attitude</td>
<td>3.871</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compensation * Platform Attitude</td>
<td>.711</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10  Significance levels are for MANOVA analysis

**Study 4 — experiment on reference group**

In Study 4, we add the factor of reference group into the research model (H4). In Study 3, all the samples came from university, so we re-test the effects of compensation again in this part to make the conclusion stable.

**Method and sample**

A 3 (compensation policy) × 2 (platform attitude) between-subjects factorial design was used. The online shopping context and the manipulations of compensation are same as Study 3. At this time we used other two pieces of online news, one is about appearance of “ward robing” in platform A and the other one is unconcerned content. A total 223 responses were obtained including 72 students and 161 working adults.

**Data and analysis**

The results of MANOVA shows (see Table 5) that service compensation can affect opportunistic claiming significantly for Low Machs (F (2,223) =3.95, p<.05, \bar{X}_{low}=1.9, \bar{X}_{medium}=2.7, \bar{X}_{high}=2.1), supporting H2 too. But the effects for high Machs were not that significant, although the trend appeared in the same way (F (2,223) =.735, p>.10, \bar{X}_{low}=3, \bar{X}_{medium}=2.6, \bar{X}_{high}=2.8).

In the aspect of reference group, it performed well only in the group of Low Machs (F (2,223) =7.114, p<.011, \bar{X}_{reference}=2.6, \bar{X}_{other}=1.8). Specifically, people had seen the news about other consumer’s opportunistic manner can be more likely to imitate and repeat this bad manner, because of conformist mentality. For the consumer who never heard about the cheating way to gain profits, would start to try, while consumer who have done the bad manners before may subconsciously rationalize their behavior and feel less guilt. However, individuals in the group of High Machs are not affected by reference group, because they are more self-centered and careless about other’s decisions. High Machs prefer guiding or leading others to being influenced.

Also, there is no interaction effect.

**Table 5 MANOVA results on opportunistic claiming**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Low level</th>
<th>High level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>df</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machiavellianism</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compensation</td>
<td>3.95</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference Group</td>
<td>7.114</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compensation * Reference Group</td>
<td>.094</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p<0.01;  ** p<0.05;  * p<0.10 Significance levels are for MANOVA analysis

**5. CONCLUSION**

Despite opportunistic behavior of consumer is common these days, the factors contributing to this phenomenon have drawn little attention especially on the context of service guarantee. In the current study, we address this gap theoretically and empirically. We adopt 4 Studies to explore the effects of three important parts of two-sided market: sellers (compensation), buyers (Machiavellianism and reference group) and platforms (platform attitude) on the opportunistic claiming behavior. The findings are as follows: 1) consumers with higher level of Machiavellianism are more likely to claim in an opportunistic manner, because they are less
sensitive to guilt and more self-centeredness. 2) The effects of compensation saw an opposite trend for different levels of Machiavellianism. The reasonable compensation (here refers to returning goods without shipping fee) would evoke the desire to do cheating behavior for Low Machs, while reduce the probability of opportunist claiming behavior for High Machs. Both platform attitude and reference group have no significant influence on High Machs. Specifically, 3) platform with tolerant attitude would face to more opportunistic claims and 4) reference group’s opportunistic manners would increase the number of opportunists only for the Low Machs.

Managerial Implication

According to the findings, a good rule of thumb for sellers would be to offer different service guarantees to different consumers. For the valued and good quality clients, the compensation can be more generous, because their will have a good impression on the shop while do nothing to cheat guarantees. On the contrast, the consumer with bad transaction record should better to be treated with the rational generous service guarantee.

In our study, opportunistic claiming was not only driven by consumer themselves and sellers, but also by the contextual variables of two-sided market. For the managers of platforms, the preceding conclusions suggest that strict policies and measurements should be applied to avoid opportunistic claims. For example, the “blacklist” of Jay consumers can be used to monitor and trace their behavior, and some special strategies should be taken to restrict their purchase. However, the news about the opportunistic phenomenon should not be announced or discussed in the public, because it would guide innocent consumers imitate or try bad manners.

Limits and Further Direction

We are also aware of some limitation in this research. Firstly, the sample size of these four studies and the projective role-playing method we applied might reduce the power of our findings. So the secondary data or the information observed directly is necessary in later study. Secondly, the approaches platforms can affect users’ opportunistic behavior are limited in this paper. For further study, the comparison between various policies is worth to explore. Thirdly, the relationship between the consumer and reference group also play a crucial role in this field. The closer friends can affect more than strangers in traditional context, but is it true in the context of opportunistic claiming? We hope future study will extend this research program and explore from a new sight.

REFERENCES